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COMMENT

THE ROLE OF TRADE & FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT
Kevin A. Hassett*
Of all the intellectual victories accomplished by economic science in
the past two-hundred years, the view that trade can improve human welfare is perhaps the most important, dating back to Adam Smith and
David Ricardo. What started out as a purely theoretical analysis of comparative advantage has, over the years, been buttressed by empirical
analysis.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a key component of trade
for decades, and has been the focus of a tidal wave of academic research
as well. Conceptually, FDI must have an important role in providing
welfare gains associated with trade. One of the key differences between
countries, after all, is the relative quantity of capital available to its citizens. In my remarks, I intend to provide a bird's eye view of the
literature on FDI with a focus on the developing country's perspective.
First and foremost, we must ask ourselves what impact FDI has on
the welfare of developing countries. On this, the literature and economic
theory are on relatively solid ground. Inflows of capital into developing
countries increase the marginal product of domestic laborers, and increase their wages as well. In theory, this link is obvious, and in the
empirical literature, the link is perhaps too strong, as suggested in a recent review.' A number of studies have found, for example, that foreign
firms pay significant wage premia over domestic firms when they begin
activity in developing nations. Graham, for example, found that U.S.
multinationals pay about double the local wage in developing countries.
This observation has been supported by numerous other studies. Lim
reports that Nike subcontractor wages were about triple the average local
minimum wage in Indonesia.' Lukacs found a similar-though slightly
less dramatic pattern-in Mexico.4
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It is worth noting that the empirical literature has also found that
there may be wage spillovers from FDI. Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey
found some evidence of spillovers, that is, that wages are higher in
locally owned plants because of FDI. 5 The evidence was stronger in the
United States than elsewhere, however. Feenstra and Hanson find a quite
plausible wage premium for skilled workers, with the fraction of firms
that are foreign owned in an industry significantly increasing wages.'
Thus, foreign investment might also be expected to help provide
developing countries with a strong incentive to increase human capital
investments. Taken together, there seems to be a reasonable consensus
that FDI significantly improves the welfare of workers in target
countries.
But what about the source countries? Popular discussions have
aroused concern of late that "outsourcing" is an important drag on employment in the United States. The argument, propounded most visibly
by television host Lou Dobbs, is that U.S. firms place capital abroad to
take advantage of low wage foreign workers, thus shifting jobs abroad.
Are the gains from FDI one-sided?
While the literature in this area is much less developed, the answer is
probably negative. U.S. multinationals compete in a world marketplace
against competitors who also have access to foreign workers. If U.S. firms
shunned "outsourcing" or "offshoring" then the results would likely be
negative at home as foreign competitors could establish a significant cost
advantage. In a recent paper, Slaughter suggests that the data may support
this view. 7 He found that foreign and domestic employment are complementary. Firms that increased foreign employment in the study's sample
also increased domestic employment.
If the Slaughter analysis stands, then FDI offers possible symmetric
benefits to countries. The investors gain a competitive edge, and the targets experience increased wages. How, then, might countries act to
increase FDI activity?
Once again, we are back to an area that has been studied extensively.
A natural policy candidate would be to reduce taxes on FDI. Since tax
policy has been found to have a significant effect on business fixed in-
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vestment in numerous studies' one might expect that FDI is also responsive.
As first noted by Auerbach and myself,9 however, this issue is much
more complicated than you might think at first glance. Tax policy that
stimulates investment can drive a wedge between the price of new and
old capital. (A hotdog stand owner is not pleased if a tax credit is passed
for new purchases of hotdog stands, which will subsidize his competition.) A large share of FDI has often been accounted for by acquisitions.
Something that reduces the price for new capital may discourage such
acquisitions. Such complications are a confounding factor for empirical
research, but despite this, a number of papers have found a solid link
between tax factors and FDI.
In a work in progress that draws on a new international tax database
we have constructed at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), we have
begun to track the links between taxes, FDI, and economic growth. We
have collected marginal tax rate data for almost every country on earth
from 1980 through 2002, and can thus perform panel data estimates that
have not been possible in the past.
Real GDP Per Capita Growth Rate vs.
Corporate Tax Rate in Developing Countries,
1981-2000
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Investment as a Percentage of GDP vs.
Corporate Tax Rate in Developing Countries,
1981-2000
50
Investmnent
=-01379 Ta,
(-3.16)

45

18.77

40

35
0W30

~20

8
s*

."15

10

-.

:

0%

5
0
0

10

20

30
40
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate

50

60

70

(%),

5 year average

Given the links that appear in the literature between taxes and FDI, and
FDI and domestic welfare, it perhaps is not surprising that the correlations between tax rates and overall growth are as strong as they are. Our
preliminary judgment is that highly mobile capital flows to jurisdictions
that tax it the least, and away from high tax nations, and that these flows
have a significant impact on output. Accordingly, there is ample room
for developing nations to consider tax policy reforms that will encourage
the capital spigot to turn in their direction. It is an open question
whether, however, whether the benefits would be so apparent in the data
if every nation set its corporate tax rate at a very low level. Absent beggar-thy-neighbor competition, the benefits would depend more on the
responsiveness of the supply of world saving to higher after-tax returns.
In the meantime, however, there appear to be clear costs to falling behind
in world tax competition.

